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NOTES
merchant who attempts to exercise the privilege. That the privilege
shields the merchant from liability for all related torts if he acts reason-
ably should be expressly stated, and more precise standards regarding the
amount of investigation and degree of force permissible should be estab-
lished. These matters ought not to be left to the interpretation of the
Ohio courts, which heretofore have hesitated to grant positive protection
to the merchant. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the statute is greatly
weakened by the provision requiring the apprehension to be made out-
side of the store, a limitation which no other legislature has deemed
necessary.
The statute is unnecessarily narrow in its scope, since there is no logi-
cal reason to legislate in favor of the mercantile trade and ignore the
similar problem faced by the restaurateur. But this statute is better than
none at all, since it at least indicates that there are public policy reasons
which demand protection for the merchant, and perhaps the courts will
construe this as a mandate for giving the statute the broadest possible
interpretation. The merchant now has a weapon with which to combat
the shoplifting problem, and even if the privilege is not often exercised,
it should be widely publicized, for in this manner the light-fingered cus-
tomer might be discouraged from giving vent to that "little bit of larceny"
in his character.
JAMES AmDUR
Criminal Insanity-A Study of Legal Inertia
The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case and in
future cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire court
since 1870. It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.'
This last sentence, pronounced by Judge David Bazelton of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in 1954, has been the source,
in the short space of four years, of one of the most heated controversies
in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It has set the legal and
medical professions against one another, and has even caused a relative
upheaval among the ranks of the respective fields. It has served as the
basis for countless essays and commentaries in law reviews and bar as-
sociation journals throughout the country, and in the reports of numerous
medical and psychiatric committees and conventions. It has evoked the
consternation or plaudits of the great names of medicine, law, and the
social sciences; Zilboorg, Menninger, Cardozo, Hand, Weihofen and
1. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Guttmacher are just a few of those whose teachings lend strength to one
side or the other.
Committees of the United States Congress are this very day studying
two proposed measures of legislation; one directed at embellishing, and
the other at eliminating, the possible effects of this solitary sentence.2
For these few words, so profound in meaning, are the context of the
celebrated, but not necessarily lauded, Durham rule.
Monte Durham, tried for housebreaking, had a long history of con-
finement and treatment at mental institutions. In spite of this, the trial
court ruled out psychiatric testimony to the effect that the accused was
of an extremely unsound mental condition, because it was not directed
to defendant's capacity to distinguish right from wrong. The appellate
court held this was error. "In the field of law as in other fields, the fact
finder should be free to consider all information advanced by relevant
disciplines.
3
Actually, this view of the criminal law of insanity, although regarded
by the majority of today's legal authorities as present day radical heresy,
is merely the reiteration of what was expressed in New Hampshire nearly
a century ago. In the 1870 case of State v. Pike4 the court held that the
verdict should be "not guilty by reason of insanity" if the killing was the
product of mental disease in the defendant, that knowledge of right and
wrong was not as a matter of law a test of mental disease, but that all
symptoms of mental disease are purely matters of fact to be determined
by the jury.5
The entrenchment of the present rule of criminal insanity is of such
depth that only two jurisdictions until 1954 have dared to attack it.
Their efforts succeeded only in evoking such disdain as was expressed
in Anderson v. United States:6
This court has no desire to join the courts of New Hampshire and D.C. in
their magnificent isolation of rebellion against McNaughton, even though
New Hampshire has been travelling down that lonesome road since
1870. Rather than stumble along with Pike, we prefer to trudge along
the now well travelled pike blazed more than a century ago by Mc-
Naughton.7
HISTORY OF McNAUGHTON
The seemingly omnipotent McNaughton, alluded to almost reverently
2. Newsweek, April 23, 1959, p. 31.
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cit. 1954).
4. 49 N. H. 399 (1870).
5. Ibid.
6. 237 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1956).
7. Id. at 127.
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by the Anderson court, was an unfortunate soul who killed the secretary
of Robert Peel in 1834 in England, while under the delusion that his
supposed enemies were persecuting him.8 He was acquitted by reason of
being mentally irresponsible, whereupon fifteen members of the bench
were called upon to promulgate, once and for all, a steadfast rule of crimi-
nal insanity.9 Such an immutable object did they create that it has, un-
like other aspects of the law, medicine, science, philosophy, and educa-
tion, withstood the best efforts of progress and time, man and nature,
with only one slight lapse.10 This archaic, and rather antiquated piece of
judicial wisdom is herein set forth:
. . . jurors ought to be told ... that to establish insanity it must clearly
be found that, at the time of ... the act the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of what he was doing, or if he did know it, that
he did not know what he was doing was wrong.11
This right-wrong test, established well over one hundred years ago, is,
as of this day, accepted as the sole test of insanity in thirty of our states,
while fifteen others and the federal system have adopted it along with
the irresistible impulse modification. 1 2  It would seem' more than just
possible that, after one hundred and twenty years of almost complete
inertia in this area of the law, the advent of a decision such as in the
Durham case would be a welcomed breath of fresh air. Yet five years
after its pronouncement the Durham rule has been rejected by all but two
of the jurisdictions that have considered it,13 these two being New
Mexico 14 and Vermont.' 5
8. Ellison and Hass, A Recent Judicial Interpretation of the McNaughton Rule, 4
BRIT. J. DELINQUENCY 129 (1953).
9. 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
10. Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cit. 1929). The test adopted by
this court, and fifteen other jurisdictions was to the effect that if an accused knew
his act was wrong, but his will was involuntarily destroyed so completely that his ac-
tion was not subject to the will, but was beyond his control, the verdict must be not
guilty by reason of insanity.
11. 10 CL. & Fin, 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. See Howard v. United States, 232 P.2d 274 (5th Cit. 1956); People v. Ryan,
140 Cal. App. 2d 412, 295 P.2d 496 (1956); State v. Iverson, 77 Idaho 103, 289
P.2d 603 (1955); People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill.2d 60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (1957); Flow-
ers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956); Thomas v. State, 206 Md.
575, 112 A.2d 913 (1955); Johnson v. State, 223 Miss. 56, 76 So.2d 841 (1955);
State v. Kitchens, 129 Mont. 331, 286 P.2d 1079 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Chester, 150 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1958); Berryman -v. State, 283 P.2d 558 (Okla.
1955).
14. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
15. VT. PUB. Acts 1957, No. 228, at 200.
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The truly appalling aspect of this situation is not that Durham has
not been accepted, but that it has been cast aside with what amounts to
almost contemptuous disregard. It is criticized not so much on a techni-
cal basis, i.e., that it may be unsound scientifically, or that the implica-
tions of its terminology are not absolutely dear, but merely because it
attempts to alter something that lawyers and judges have become so ac-
customed to that they cannot believe another alternative could possibly
exist, let alone a better one.
LEGAL INERTIA
What is even more dismaying about this indifference expressed for
the possible significant import of the Durham decision, is that the right-
wrong test has been vigorously denounced by several of our most out-
standing authorities from the very time of its inception. In fact, in
1838, five years even before the test was incorporated in the McNaaghton
rule, Doctor Isaac Ray, great nineteenth century American authority on
legal psychiatry, criticized the basing of responsibility on the ability to
distinguish right from wrong.16 His English contemporary, Dr. Henry
Maudsley, further declared that in setting forth the McNaughton rule the
judges had held "to an absurd dictum which has long since been dis-
credited by medical science."
1 7
The list of psychiatrists who discredit the McNaughton rule is too
endless to attempt to set forth here. But such outstanding men in the
field as William White, Menninger, Overholzer and Zilboorg, have been
unrelenting in their criticism of the test.' 8 In polls conducted by the
American Psychiatric Association and by the Group for the Advancement
of Psychiatry, the right-wrong test has been convincingly rejected as a
competent basis for determining criminal insanity.19
The legal disdain for the psychiatrist's views in this area could almost
be considered ludicrous, if the subject weren't of such a vital nature. The
court in United States v, Sauaer2 quoted one authority in saying, "psy-
chiatry is still more of an art than a science."'" What this court over-
looked, as so many have, was that its own cherished right-wrong test was
16. RAY, MEDICAL JUIsPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 47 (1938).
17. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325
(1955).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid; See also MODEL PENAL CODE 268 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
20. Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1957).
21. Id. at 650, quoting Sullivan, Psychiatry, 12 ENCYC. Soc. ScI. 580 (1934). For
full discussion of this view see Hall, Mental Disease And Criminal Responsibility,
45 COLuM. L REv. 677 (1945).
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originally formulated in the early 1800's on the basis of the then existing
psychiatric theories. Having accepted for its own use the sdentific
knowledge of 1800, the Law has subsequently refused to acknowledge
that medical science may have progressed any further in the succeeding
century and a half.
The situation as it exists today, can possibly be illustrated in its en-
tirety by the following commentary concerning the rejection by the
Louisiana State Institute of Law of an insanity rule similar in nature to
that of the Durham decision.
The really depressing thing was the spectacle of a group of prominent
lawyers, judges, and law teachers sitting calmly by, and on the basis of
the personal experiences of each, either denying or ignoring the existence
of scientific facts about mental diseases. Personal experience and intui-
tive judgment perhaps remain practically the only sources of reference
in many legal fields, but here is one in which other factual scientific bases
exist, which cry out to high heaven for recognition.... Nevertheless...
Louisiana remains saddled with a test of legal insanity that is about as
modern as a witchcraft trial.22
Such inertia would surely seem to be the complete antithesis of the
very vital and vibrant American way of life. If the lethargy itself is dis-
maying, then the reasons behind it must be considered even more so.
Perhaps the answer was best expressed by Judge Harold Medina of the
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in his address on law reform to the
New York Law Association in 1956.
I think we lawyers are seriously delinquent. Whether through
selfishness and a desire to avoid.., learning new law, or over conserva-
tism, or fear of getting in wrong with judges and losing clients or sheer
laziness, the fact is we lawyers on the whole shrink from battle when
it comes to fighting for improvements in the administration of justice.23
Rather a damning condemnation of one's profession, but who can
summarily deny its validity? The reader should not gain the impression
that it is only the legal theorist or the psychiatric idealist who advocate
a change after so many years. Quite the contrary. Two present members
of our Supreme Court Bench, Justices Frankfurter 24 and Douglas,25 and
former Solicitor General of the United States Simon Sobeloff,26 presently
a judge in the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, have joined in renounc-
22. Morrow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942, 17 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1942).
23. 12 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 471, 475 (1957).
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, p. 174 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
25. Douglas, J., The Durham Rule: A 2Meeting Ground For Lawyers & Psychia-
trists, 41 IowA L. REv. 485 (1956).
26. Sobeloff, The Law of Criminal Insanity; From McNaughton to Durham & Be-
yond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955).
19591
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ing this unyielding regard for judicial precedent in the area of criminal
insanity.
Appearing before the British Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment, Justice Frankfurter decried the situation presently existing that
"rules of law should be arrested at the state of psychological knowledge
at the time when they were formulated .... I dare to believe that we
ought not to rest content with the difficulty of finding an improvement
in the McNaughton rule.
27
EVOLUTION OF INSANITY RULE
The Durham rule is something new in that it is only the second de-
cision of its nature, but the underlying stimulus for it goes back to the
very beginning of time. For the true motivation behind Durham is evo-
lution, or advancement, or progress; it is still the same regardless of what
name it is given. Judge Bazelton, like many, yet comparatively so few
before him, realized that the Law is not a static entity; it is not an abso-
lute. It is flexible; it must shift and bend to meet the needs of the so-
ciety it serves. Those who still maintain that the precedent of the right-
wrong test must not be upset, are closing their eyes and their minds to
the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The right-wrong test itself
is but a modification of a prior insanity test. At the turn of the nine-
teenth century, the public began to rebel, on the basis of the then latest
medical knowledge, against the inhumanity of the "Mad Beast Rule" of
Rex v. Arnold.28  Thus it was that the ability to distinguish right from
wrong became the criterion for determining mental responsibility.
Through the years there have been sporadic outbursts of judicial re-
bellion against the heavy hand of precedent. Unfortunately, these singular
individuals were unable to voice a majority opinion, with the exception
of the New Hampshire court, until the recent District of Columbia de-
cision.
What is even more remarkable about this almost religious adherence
to the right-wrong test is that, but for the public outcry at McNaughton's
acquittal, the law of insanity might well have been that of the Durham
decision as early as the 1840's. There was a definite trend toward the
shaping of such a law prior to the McNaughton case, following the lead
27. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 325,
326 (1955).
28. Glueck, MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAw, 138, 139 (1925), citing
Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724). An accused could escape punish-
ment if he did not know what he was doing "no more than a wild beast." Also at
p. 142, citing Earl Ferrer's Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 886 (1760).
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of the brilliant defense made by the eloquent Thomas Erskine in gaining
the acquittal of the defendant in the James Hatfield case of 1800.29
Advocating that people might know the difference between right and
wrong yet still be held insane, Erskine described them as persons who:
... often reason with a subtlety which puts in the shade the ordinary
conceptions of mankind: their conclusions are just and frequently sound:
but the premises from which they reason, when within the range of the
malady, are uniformly false: not false from any defect of knowledge ofjudgment, but, because a delusive image, the inseparable companion of
real insanity, is thrust upon the subjugated understanding, incapable of
resistance because unconscious of attack.30
Justice Douglas, commenting on the insanity rule, felt that the law
might well have been evolved upon this line of reasoning, had not poli-
tics and the press conspired against the development in that direction.3 1
AN EVER-PRESENT UNDERCURRENT
Despite the efforts of every jurisdiction (except New Hampshire)
the reasoning of Erskine has never been completely eradicated from our
court decisions. It is frequently found in the vigorous dissents of the
leading cases cited by proponents of the right-wrong test.
In State v. Hortoz,32 the defense psychiatrist had testified that the
defendant, a college youth who had killed his father, was mentally de-
ranged to the extent that he harbored delusions of persecution by his
father, which in his mind, was the cause of the decline of his grades from
average to failing, the reduction of his intelligence quotient from one
hundred and eight to eighty-one, his social rejection, and finally his en-
gaging in homosexual relations. In commenting on the trial court's
striking of all such psychiatric testimony, except that which related to
defendant's ability to distinguish right from wrong, Justice Van Voorhees,
in dissent, cited People v. Ode11 3 3 for the contention that:
The better principle for a court in a criminal case, emphatically in a
capital case, . . . is to present to the jury the case on trial in all the
phases in which the jury ought to consider it. Much latitude must be
allowed in the application of this precept but to charge ... without ad-
verting in any respect to the testimony might result in harmful prejudice.
The trial judge should not . . . limit himself to stating good set terms
of law culled from the codes; ... jurors need not legal definitions merely.
29. Trial of James Hatfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282 (1800).
30. Id. at 1314. See also 41 IowA L REv. 485, 487, (1956).
31. Douglas, J., The Durham Rule: A Meeting Ground for Lawyers and Psychia-
trixs, 41 IowA L. REV. 485 (1956).
32. 308 N. Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609 (1954).
33. 230 N.Y. 481, 130 N.E. 619 (1921).
1959)
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
They require proper instructions as to the method of applying such
definitions after reaching their conclusions on the facts.8 4
A similar desire to escape the confines of the right-wrong test was
expressed in the dissent of Chief Justice Biggs in United States ex tel,
Smith v. Baldi:
From this hundred year old conception, unchanged by the passage of
time, or the advance of science, grew the right and wrong test....
This doctrine has plagued the law of Pennsylvania as it does that of most
other states.... It need not always be so. Changes can be effected and
reason can be brought to the law of criminal insanity. The rule of Mc-
Naughton's case was created by decision. Perhaps it is not too much to
think that it may be altered by the same means.3 5
It is of more than minor significance, in considering this issue, that
the proponents of enlarging the scope of our insanity rule have not al-
ways been confined to the role of minority dissenters. Courts in several
of the leading cases which uphold McNaughton have been dearly cogni-
zant of the need of a more flexible and comprehensive standard. In Peo-
ple v. Sherwood, in reference to the defense's claim that the accused killed
her child because she had become obsessed with the delusion that only in
death could the child gain freedom from pain and suffering, the court
pointed out that: "[t ] he time was gone by when such a claim could seem
fantastic, either to judge or juror. While we still - and rightly - ac-
cept the validity of such claims with the utmost of caution, we neverthe-
less know now that they may be valid."36 In a subsequent case, People
v. Schmidt, the New York court further declared: "[w]e must not ...
exaggerate the rigor of the rule ... if in so doing, we rob the rule of all
relation to the mental health and true capacity of the criminal" 3 T
Perhaps no one case has ever presented as complete and complex a
picture of the relevant aspects of legal insanity as the Parsons case of
1886 in Alabama.3 8 Time and again this court's decision has been cited
by those who advocate the tenets of McNaughton. Yet the context of the
opinion reflects much the same attitude as expressed by the Pike and
Durham courts. So true is this, that Judge Somerville cited Pike, in sup-
port of his view that the concepts of criminal insanity must be enlarged
to coincide with the latest scientific doctrines.39 Thus it is that we have
34. 308 N. Y. 1, 21, 123 N.E.2d 609, 616 (1954).
35. 192 F.2d 540, 567 (3rd Cir. 1951).
36. 271 N. Y. 427, 430, 3 N.E.2d 581, 582 (1936).
37. 216 N. Y. 324, 339, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (1915).
38. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
39. Id. at 592, 2 So. at 859. The Parsons case in turn was cited for this view of
the law of insanity by Cardozo, J. in People v. Schmidt, supra note 37, at 388.
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the paradoxical situation of a Parsons Rule and a Parsons Law.40 The
court upheld the right-wrong test as a valid criterion for determining
mental responsibility, while at the same time criticizing those who
adamantly refuse to recognize that the Law must not stand with feet
of day.
May there not be insane persons, of a diseased brain, who while capable
of perceiving the difference between right and wrong .. .so far under
the duress of such disease as to destroy the power to choose... ? Will
the courts assume as a matter of fact, not to be rebutted by any amount
of scientific evidence or any new discoveries of medical science, that there
is and can be no such state of mind as that described by the writer on
psychological medicince... ?4
It is indeed curious that the jurists who years later cite the rule of
Parsons never pay heed to the profound judicial wisdom of the Parsons
opinion.
DURHA - A STEP FORWARD
The problem presented thus far is not one which will be resolved
merely by a general adoption of the Durham decision and a rejection of
McNaughton. Nor does there seem to be any likelihood that any one
absolute rule can be set forth which will meet the necessities of all pos-
sible fact situations. Certainly the Durham rule is no such end, in and
of itself. It is, in fact, subject to much valid criticism. But it does ap-
pear to be a step forward in the direction of progress and enlightenment.
In a jurisdiction which allowed the broader consideration of criminal in-
sanity, the psychiatrist would be permitted to testify to the complete
mental condition of an accused; his emotional and volitive faculties as
well as those of cognition and intellect 42 The jury would still make their
traditional moral judgments based upon our basic philosophy of imposing
no punishment where there is no blame 3 But in making such judg-
ments they would at least now be guided by wider knowledge and in-
sight of the mental condition of a fellow human being's mind.
This is directly in line with the apparent objectives of the American
Law Institutes Model Code,44 which criticizes both McNaughton, for be-
ing too narrow in scope, and Durham, for being too ambiguous. In pro-
posing its test, whereby one is not criminally responsible if he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
40. Note, 10 ALA. L. REv. 118 (1957).
41. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 584, 2 So. 854, 859 (1887).
42. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
43. Id. at 876.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,45 the Model Code
seems to contemplate a combination which would give recognition to the
individual whose mental condition lay somewhere between the poles of
complete mental collapse and complete understanding.
In its present status, the law of criminal insanity may well be con-
sidered to have failed to carry out the very purpose of our legal system.
The Law is but a manifestation of the needs and wants of the society it
serves. When it fails to fulfill the duty impressed upon it, it loses all
reason for its existence.
What is the purpose of our system of criminal law? The purpose is
punishment,46 from which we desire to derive retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and protection. 47 Although the layman may express dis-
belief, retribution alone is not the sole objective of society's punishment
measures. It this weren't true, why then would we excuse children under
a minimum age, persons under duress, and the mentally disordered? 48 Ob-
viously because these people are not responsible and any civilized society
abhors inflicting punishment upon those not responsible for their acts.49
If these four elements be our objectives, then it is the author's con-
tention that our criminal law fails in the area of insanity; a contention
dearly illustrated in the case of United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi.50
Schizophrenia is medically defined as "a severe emotional disorder of
psychotic depth, characteristically marked by a retreat from reality with
delusion formations, hallucinations, emotional disharmony and aggressive
behavior."5' In the Baldi case the defendant was a classic schizophrenic, 52
nonetheless he was declared sane and convicted because 'he could distin-
guish right from wrong.53
Here is a classic example of the stifling effect of the McNaughton
constriction. Did this conviction serve society's purpose? It would seem
not. Obviously there can be no rehabilitation without the aid of psy-
chiatric treatment, which is not likely to be found within prison walls.
Because there could be no rehabilitation, there could be no permanent or
lasting protection for society from such an individual unless he was con-
fined for life or executed. It is doubtful also that a prison sentence
45. Ibid.
46. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND MORAL LAw 91 (1953).
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. 192 F.2d 540 (3d Cir. 1951).
51. AM. PSYCH. ASs'N, A PsYcHIATRc GLossARY 41 (1957).
52. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 208 (19555).
53. Ibid.
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would deter this type of person, due to his complete withdrawal from
reality. If such a conviction is anything but a failure, it would indeed
be difficult to prove.
Again, let it be made dear that the Durham rule should not be con-
sidered a panacea for all the ills of our criminal insanity law. But it is
quite probable that offenders such as Baldi would be acquitted under a
rule such as that of New Hampshire, D. C., Vermont, New Mexico, or
the Model Code. With the proper commitment procedures, as provided
for in the nation's capital," they would be confined in institutions where
they might be treated and rehabilitated to the point where they could
safely be returned to society with the expectation of their filling useful
and worthwhile roles in our scheme of life.
It would be the height of naivete, of course, to suppose that all these
people could be successfully treated. But surely it would benefit society
far more to help those who are capable of responding, than to merely
lock them behind bars for a period of time and then send them back to
our streets just as dangerous to themselves and to the public as ever. Yet
this is precisely what happens to our McNaughton criminal; he is con-
victed and imprisoned knowing right from wrong, and with this same
knowledge he is released. But his mental condition in all likelihood is
the very same if not worse, when he walks out of, as when he walked
into, the prison.
Justice Musmanno crystallized this problem in his dissenting opinion
in Commonwealth v. Elliot:
Of course, if a tiger is to be killed simply because he is a tiger, then dis-
cussion in a case of this character is superfluous. But if in ascertaining
the reasons and cause which make a man-tiger, we find a moral responsi-
bility which does not keep pace with the bestial development, we are
charged with the duty of considering whether that failure in moral
capacity should not soften the blow of the iron hammer of retribution.f5
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis the question to be resolved is a simple one:
whether we shall adhere to an old rule of legal responsibility, based on
medical theories promulgated one hundred and fifty years ago, which
refuses to recognize any evidence of insanity except the solitary test of
mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or whether the courts
will recognize as a possible fact the doctrine now alleged by those who
have made the study of insanity their lives' work - that the old test is
wrong and that there is no single test by which the existence of the
54. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-301 (1951).
55. 371 Pa. 70, 83, 89 A.2d 782, 788 (1952).
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disease, to that degree which exculpates from punishment, can in every
case be unfallibly detected? The answer seems obvious:
The inquiry must not be unduly obstructed by the doctrine of stare
decisis, for the life of the Common law system and the hope of its
permanency consist largely in its power of adaptation to new scientific
discoveries, and the requirements of an ever advancing civilization. 56
These were the words of Judge Somerville seventy-three years ago in
the Parsons case. It is to be regretted that such a small segment of the
legal profession has seen fit to heed his advice.
ROBERT A. GOODMAN
56. Parsons v. State, 81 ALa. 577, 584, 2 So. 854, 858 (1887).
